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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

ADVISORY BOARD

SUBJECT:

Establishment of Arms Control Verification

Committee (U)

The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive establishing a Verification Committee. (U)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

Attachment

National Security Decision
Directive 65

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

November 10, 1982

National Security Decision Directive Number 65

ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION COMMITTEE (U)

Compliance with the provision of existing and future arms control agreements is essential to their success and therefore to US national security. Effective verification is necessary to ensure compliance with those agreements. Verification serves to detect possible violations of an agreement and provides timely warning of threats to our national security arising under an arms control treaty regime. Verification is also necessary to assure the confidence of the Congress and the public at large that specific arms control measures are compatible with our security. (U)

Effective verification may involve a number of policy judgments in addition to judgments about intelligence monitoring of the technical provisions of specific arms control agreements. The government must be organized and prepared to deal with all aspects of arms control monitoring, verification, and compliance issues in a systematic, orderly and timely manner. The degree of verifiability of proposed agreements must be adequately described for policymakers and judgments of effective verifiability must be fully integrated into the arms control planning and decision process. (U)

In the past, considerations of verification issues, especially allegations of violations and/or deceptions concerning various agreements, have proved to be unusually complex and difficult to resolve. In order to address issues of arms control verification and compliance more effectively and as an integral part of the arms control policy process, it is essential that an appropriate mechanism be established to deal with them comprehensively, in an integrated fashion, and on a continuing basis. (C)

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Establishment of the Verification Committee

Therefore, in order to provide a focus for national arms control verification and compliance policy, a Verification Committee is established. The Verification Committee shall report to the National Security Council and shall be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. (U)

Membership of the Verification Committee

Membership shall include: senior representatives of the Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; Director of Central Intelligence; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (U)

Responsibilities of the Verification Committee

Responsibilities of the Verification Committee shall include the following: (U)

- Development of US Government policy relative to verification and compliance. (C)
- Formulation of strategies for dealing with compliance problems. (C)
- Review of all arms control provisions or agreements developed in the interagency process with a view to assessing their verifiability, including START, INF, MBFR, Nuclear Testing, and Chemical and Biological Warfare. (C)
- Monitoring on a continuous basis the compliance situation in all arms control areas. (U)
- Review of requirements and threats to US monitoring capabilities and recommendations for assuring the required capabilities. (C)
- Overseeing preparation of periodic and special reports on compliance issues for the NSC and the President. (U)
- Overseeing United States Government preparation of periodic reports to Congress on verifiability as mandated by Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. (U)

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Support of Interagency Groups

Appropriate interagency groups shall report to and support the Verification Committee on arms control verification issues as required. (U)

Immediate Tasks

The Verification Committee will undertake the following immediate actions: (U)

- Ensure the integration and prioritization of ongoing START and INF verification and monitoring work programs into a single coherent program of work. (C)
- A comprehensive review of current compliance issues with respect to all existing arms control agreements, particularly SALT, Nuclear Testing, and Chemical and Biological Warfare. (C)
- Creation of a permanent "Red Team" to challenge US verification capabilities, assumptions and policies. This team would anticipate how, in what ways, and for what purposes the Soviets might try to avoid compliance with the provisions of arms control agreements. START and INF should have highest priority. (S)
- A detailed examination of the benefits and limitations of cooperative verification measures, including "on-site" inspection. (S)

Implementing Procedures

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall establish procedures to implement this Decision Directive. (U)

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